‘Joint operations room comprising Hamas, Hezbollah, IRGC directed Gaza war’: Al-Akhbar Chief


Editor-in-Chief of the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, Ibrahim al-Amin, reveals how a joint operations room was set up in Beirut during the latest conflict between Israel and the Palestinian factions of Gaza, bringing together military leaders from Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC).

The operations room, al-Amin explains, was aimed at coordinating the overall military confrontation with Israel, providing military intelligence, and sending material reinforcements into Gaza during the conflict.

Amin made these comments in an appearance on a Lebanese political talk show in late May, days after a ceasefire was reached between Israel and Gaza.

Al-Manar TV, via Kalam Siyasi (YouTube Channel)

Date: 29 May, 2021



Mr. Ibrahim, since we’re discussing the coordination between the parties of the Axis of Resistance, senior Hamas leader, Yahya Sinwar, revealed that the coordination with the resistance in Lebanon was at its highest (level) throughout the entire period of “The Sword of al-Quds” (war); what is the importance of this coordination, and how did it affect the course of the battle, both practically, and in the field?

Ibrahim al-Amin:

The other day, Sayed (Hasan Nasrallah) used an expression when he spoke about (the new formula), (he said) if al-Quds and other sanctities were targeted, that this will risk (igniting)…

Host: This formula…


…a regional war. He also said that (should that happen), then there will be no red lines, nor any made-up borders and so…I would like to use this statement to say that, yes, there was a joint operations room in Beirut that brought together the relevant officers from the Islamic Resistance (i.e. Hezbollah), battlefield officers from Hamas and other factions, and officers from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and even the commander of the al-Quds force, Ismail Qa’ani, came twice to Beirut during the war. The resistance in Lebanon succeeded in transporting senior field officers from Hamas to Beirut.

Host: During the confrontation?

Al-Amin:  During the war.

Host: During the war?!


Yes, through special means. This (operations) room was dealing with coordination not only at the level of the exchange of experiences or tactics, but there was also two intelligence apparatuses; as you know, in such a battle, military intelligence apparatuses are the ones that do a lot of the work. There was a need in the Palestinian resistance to carry out reconnaissance on the enemy’s movement, and that was what the “air force” of the Resistance (Axis) was working on. The Israelis shot down one (reconnaissance) aircraft, but that does not mean that only one drone was involved; they (the Israelis) said it was Iranian, however, let them say whatever want, it does not matter.

Host: So there was a joint management of the battle by both the Palestinian factions and the Lebanese resistance?

Al-Amin: Mainly Hamas.

Host: Hamas. So, it was Hamas, Hezbollah, and the IRGC, wasn’t the Islamic Jihad involved?


Of course. By the way, in this battle, (Islamic) Jihad showed capabilities that surprised its allies; in terms of its capabilities, their intensity, and the tactics adopted. It lost around, I believe, 19 martyrs in the (Gaza) Strip in this battle, but this did not prevent it from playing a number of effective roles. I am speaking in terms of the great difference between Hamas and (Islamic) Jihad in terms of the structure, capabilities, capacities and so on. However, (Islamic) Jihad did things that had significant results that were noticed by Hamas itself and by others as well.

What I want to say is that, through this coordination, I will go deeper in this regard, the Lebanese resistance, which helps the Palestinian resistance in Gaza, was successful, even during the war, in delivering items needed by the resistance in Gaza.

Host: During the war!?

Al-Amin: Yes, during the war.

Host: During the last battle!?

Al-Amin: Yes, to the inside of Gaza. The other issue is about the possibility of (this latest war) to snowball (into..)

Host: Was this possible (i.e. snowballing into a wider conflict)?

Al-Amin: It was possibe that the Israelis would go mad and go for a…

Host: You mean (as a means) to find a way out?


With Israel, it is possible. So, it was inevitable that the resistance in Lebanon; look, the (Resistance) Axis, plainly speaking, from the South of Lebanon to Sana’a, the Axis…

Host: (Was) ready (for such a scenario)?

Al-Amin: …(was) in a state of readiness in case the Israelis decided on taking matters to another level…

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