Description:
The following is an extended translation from a talk show on the LBCI Lebanese television channel. The show brings together two academics from separate political camps. The exchanges between the two guests, and between the guests and the host, help readers gain a better understanding of the deep crisis that Lebanon faces as a political entity at this crucial historical juncture.
The guests in the talk show are:
– Dr Joseph Bahout: Associate Professor and Director of the American University of Beirut’s Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs
– Dr Houssam Matar: a Lebanese writer and researcher specialized in international relations. He regularly identifies with Hezbollah’s political path during television appearances
Please note: the transcript is a mixture of word-for-word translation and – for the sake of brevity – translation summaries
Source: LBCI
Date: September 9, 2021
(Note: Please help us keep producing independent translations by contributing a small monthly amount here )
Transcript:
Host:
Today, in addition to all the crises that Lebanon is experiencing due to the fuel crisis, there is a serious problem (related to) the long queues and humiliation of the Lebanese people at the petrol stations. How long will this humiliation last for?
Dr Houssam Matar, a Lebanese writer and researcher specialized in international relations:
– Unfortunately, whether they are international organizations that have expertise in crises similar to ours or they are (local) political forces, they all agree that we are facing years of crisis.
– And this is even if the required work is carried out – work which today’s (political forces) are clearly incapable of doing, or they won’t do because they wish to preserve their (narrow) interests.
– Estimations say we need five years until we can begin getting out of this crisis, and only if required measures are implemented.
Host:
You talked about a very important point, that today, they know what’s the solution, but it’s not in the benefit of some (Lebanese) sides, who today don’t have an interest in adopting a clearly defined solution, forming a government of competent specialists, negotiating with the World Bank, reforms that will allow cash to flow into Lebanon. Who deems fixing the situation in Lebanon as being against their interests? (Who has no problem with) leading (the country) to mass destruction?
Matar:
– They all have interest in fixing this (current) reality (of crisis) but none are able to pay the price; they all have built their popular bases and grown upon the old sectarian regime which was basically formed after the civil war. Therefore, their existence and influence is based on the continuation of this regime.
– They’re trying to revive this dead (regime) that won’t come back to life; they’re not willing to make concessions.
– They are waiting for the old traditional Lebanese game; waiting for international (help and foreign interference), not seemingly knowing that the (power) balances in Lebanon have changed and that it’s not like the 1990s or the civil war anymore, and so they (continue to) wait for the ‘external vaccine’ instead of making concessions.
– The sides that should make concessions simply, through reading the history of Lebanon since the 1990s till today, are two and a half poles:
First: capitalists who benefited a lot from the banking sector.
Second: major traders, owners of (exclusive import) permits, and monopolists.
Third: political parties that joined the game of corruption and quotas in partnership with the other two forces and established patronage networks.
-These three (poles) are the ones who prevent the solution and demand measures that throw the burden of the crisis on the people, and they have succeeded in this overall for two years to date, and the worst that could happen to the Lebanese has happened.
Host:
You’re talking about parties in Lebanon who are waiting for the ‘external vaccine’ as you called it, is Hezbollah among these parties?
Matar:
-Partially to a certain extent, Hezbollah believes that fixing the reality in Lebanon is very hard, there is a need for internal and regional compensation as usual because of the sectarian sensitivity that arose following Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah’s proposal for a founding conference in 2012.
Host:
You mentioned a very important point I wanted to ask about the founding conference which Sayyed Nasrallah spoke about in 2012, can we say that after 10 years, the Secretary General of Hezbollah Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah’s request (that the country’s political forces) form a founding conference (still) aligns with (Hezbollah’s and Nasrallah’s) interests?
Matar:
– We need a new governance formula that redistributes power and wealth in Lebanon, either through the development of the Taif Agreement’s clauses, or by using another (model), regardless what Hezbollah wishes for, as they aren’t thinking about this issue at all (, their main concern is their responsibilities on the path of resistance against Israel and have no desire to dominate over internal affairs).
Host:
What are they thinking about?
Matar:
– This issue has led us to (think of a solution for the crisis), I have the text of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah’s speech (on the founding conference) in 2012 and I thought of reading it this morning to see why did a great objection come about (from certain Lebanese political forces) back then, so I printed it out to read.
– Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah called for establishing a national Lebanese founding conference similar to those taking place in the region after the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, (which entails forming) a new assembly of experts. (Nasrallah said at the time): ‘let’s develop the concept further; let’s elect a founding conference, (in which) the Lebanese people elect (its members), not based on sectarian or area considerations; we could establish it based on segments, percentages, and we can include politicians, professors, judges, lawyers, representatives of trade unions and workers. It could consist of 50, 70, or 150 members and we give them a time limit ranging between six to twelve months to sit and decide between each other instead of us (current officials) fighting with each other. They would suggest what we could do e.g develop the Taif agreement, modify the Taif agreement, go for comprehensive secularization, or abolish political sectarianism’. These are the proposals (Nasrallah had) suggested. (Let) them study (the situation) and give us proposals, because the trajectory of the country, under this governance, will lead to where we’ve reached today (i.e the current crisis).
Host:
There is a major question, we’re speaking about these issues; secularism, participation, university professors to decide, and today, in a government of specialists and qualified members, the Lebanese parties are not accepting – Hezbollah included – to appoint specialist ministers who aren’t affiliated to any party, how can we believe this talk?
Matar:
-The two ministers who represent Hezbollah in the current government are technocrats, the Minister of Health is a doctor or a pharmacist, and the Minister of Industry also is (proficient) in the field (of industry), they’re among the best in the government today.
Host:
But we can’t hide the truth that they follow Hezbollah, therefore the trait of ‘speciality’ doesn’t apply to them.
Matar:
– True, because simply, there’s nothing called (completely) ‘independent’, nobody today in a country that has such political questions (issues and concerns) would bring someone ‘independent’ and tell them to ‘go ahead and manage the crisis’.
– If the crisis was a technical (crisis), we could’ve done this, but we both know that the crisis is essentially political; (it is rooted in the issues of) how we should redistribute power and wealth in the country, which can’t be handed to purely technical (experts).
Host:
So the founding conference that Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah spoke about in 2012 – which you’ve read parts of on appointing professors – won’t be applicable in Lebanon today?
Matar:
– He was talking before the crisis, he was saying let’s go for this option – like what other Arab countries were doing (back then) – in order to avoid a crisis.
Host:
How many times does the formation of governments get interrupted for months because of (sectarian) quotas? It has been happening for years!…
Matar:
– This is because there’s no comprehensive international and external sponsorship for Lebanon, which is an issue that needs extended explanation.
– (Traditional) political powers are in panic mode (today), as they have lost almost everything they had, so they’re holding onto what’s left for them.
– Everyone knows we’re today in a foundational stage, whether we like it or not, regardless of who proposes it, we are in a foundational stage.
Host:
We’ll talk about this stage and discuss the issue of a founding conference further with Dr Joseph Bahout, Associate Professor of Practice and Director of Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs after this commercial.
(Host welcomes the second guest Dr Joseph Bahout)
Host:
We’ve reached to the point of the founding conference which Sayyed Nasrallah spoke about in 2012 and we remember how a huge disagreement came up when Sayyed Nasrallah spoke about it and it was never mentioned again. After 10 years, is Sayyed Nasrallah’s demand for establishing a founding conference being fulfilled? Especially after Dr Matar’s statements that we’re naturally heading towards a foundational stage?
Dr Joseph Bahout, Associate Professor and Director of the AUB Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs:
This issue is on two levels: Lebanese and regional
– You, and Mr Houssam, will be surprised (to hear that) I agree with Mr Houssam that a f founding conference should have happened since 2005.
– Taif (Agreement) (in 2005) was dealth a (heavy) blow, and since then it has not been applicable and we’ve been living in a transitional stage.
– Since 9/11, the region and Lebanon has been changing.
– People who protested on Oct 17th, 2019 demanded a founding conference, and his beatitude the Patriarch (Bechara Boutros Al-Rahi) called for an international conference, and such a conference requires the presence of a strong Lebanese (representation) which would form the founding conference.
Host:
What will the core of this founding conference be? What form will it have?
Bahout:
-The question is, shall it be proposed now during this reality (filled with crises)?
-The world is changing, the Lebanese cannot see this because of the crises they’ve been experiencing, (crises) that didn’t start yesterday only, but have been going on for 10 years and we couldn’t see it.
– The (Middle East) region is being re-established.
-Regardless of its name and who proposes it, we’ve reached a place, this entity, or this country, needs another thing, what is this thing? The options remain open.
– We approached the end of a certain Lebanese era.
Host:
This is what I want to ask Dr Houssam Matar about: How would the form of a founding conference be in a collapsed and fragile country (such as Lebanon) whose institutions are collapsing, what form would it have?
Matar:
– Firstly, I had mentioned that the reason why Hezbollah partially counts on an external solution is that Hezbollah believes they have tried to (reach a solution) from within the existing regime, particularly in 2012, and faced a very large and hostile campaign in response; having their own concerns (from) sectarianism and (their priority of the) resistance, they withdrew it.
– Secondly, I believe, and so does a part of Hezbollah’s environment, that Hezbollah must put forward their visions of reform regardless of the concerns and disagreements that may be raised.
– Thirdly – and probably someone from Hezbollah would call me when I get out of (the studio) and say ‘we don’t wish to talk about this issue’, because they are so careful (not to frighten anyone with their weapons/power) – Sayyed Nasrallah called in a recent speech for such an agreement under one condition: common consensus.
– The world is changing and the region is as well; there are new balances (of power) in the region, and this (current Lebanese) regime was established after the (Lebanese) Civil War.
– The UN Security Council Resolution 1559 called for Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon and the disarmament of Hezbollah; and these (provisions) were part of the foundations on which the Taif Agreement was built.
-None of the pillars of Taif exist today, neither the territorial settlement, nor the balances (of power) of the 1990s that consider the US as the winner of the Cold War and as being capable of imposing its agenda.
-The (current) cold international management of Lebanon is a (contributing factor) to the crisis of government (in our country today).
Host:
Taif wasn’t (fully) implemented, if we are to ask whether it has had effective results or not….
Matar:
-True, no text (of an agreement) is implemented as it is, it’s applied according to balances (of power), and the (Taif Agreement) was implemented according to balances (of power) involving the Saudis, the French, the Syrians.
– Some suggest applying the Taif Agreement now; (for example, implementing) 12 reform laws that were supposed to be passed by 1994, including a new electoral law, administrative decentralization, exclusive permits, etc.
– This founding era (today) will be based mainly on regional and local balances (of power), part of it is waiting for…
Host:
The Iranian-American deal?
Matar:
– It’s waiting for the settlement of the regional balances (of power), and it awaits the question of US (policy) and where its heading to, and a part of it is related to the parliamentary elections in Lebanon (and the implications of that on) the new balances (of power) that it will produce. Based on that, real political talk will begin.
Host:
Until we reach this stage Dr Matar is talking about, can Lebanon tolerate the upcoming months under this (social & economic) collapse? And we’re going towards a total lifting of fuel, medicine, and food subsidies and all these things. Will Lebanon tolerate the current situation until the regional (issues) settle to see what effect it will have on Lebanon?
Bahout:
– Whether it tolerates or not, the only choice we have is to cope with this collapse and wait in a manner that allows us to enter a new phase without having lost all the cards we have.
– Unfortunately, the fault is in the political and financial classes, the management of the crisis is not at the required level.
– Lebanon is always a reflection of the regional solutions (i.e political & strategic transformations),unless the Lebanese decide differently.
Host:
Why does this political class have no intention of reform?
Bahout:
– Because this political regime reached the end of its era; we’ve been living with a fundamental flaw since 2005.
– Another indication that it’s over: the proposal of different (solutions) means that everyone believes it’s over.
– Such proposals are only raised when there’s a historical re-establishment like in the 1920s, 1940s, 1960s, after and during wars.
– We’ve tried applying the Taif (Agreement) in all its forms, (clearly) we cannot depend on it anymore.
Host:
Has the Senate been implemented (i.e. established/formed)?
Bahout:
– Exactly, I wanted to reach to this point,
– I’m in an assembly that’s working on establishing the Senate. If it’s done and implemented, wouldn’t this be a founding conference? What’s a founding conference after all? This is a founding conference.
Host:
Certain Lebanese groups have concerns that this founding conference would go against their interests, but things aren’t as simple as you’re describing. Today we’re in front of sects, quotas, sectarianism, it’s not that simple, or else the crisis would’ve ended a long time ago.
Bahout:
– It’s like when you need to do a surgery, you can’t avoid it anymore so the question wouldn’t be whether to do it or not, it’d be how, when, and who would do it for me, despite the fears.
– The Syrian issue Mr Houssam mentioned is a main issue in the Taif Agreement, which is weird for a national agreement.
– The Taif hasn’t tackled the sectarian issue between Sunnis and Shias, it only focused on a Christian-Muslim agreement.
– All the pillars of the Taif (Agreement) have fallen, so applying it is not possible anymore.
– Iran is the most qualified force to sponsor (internal Lebanese) negotiations, but it’s not an Arab country.
-Today we lack the political forces and minds that worked on an agreement like the Taif.
– I will say something in front of Mr Houssam now –
Host:
You’re saying it in front of millions of viewers…
Bahout:
– I intend to address Mr Houssam: when I get the chance to negotiate with people close to the side he’s close to (i.e Hezbollah), I will clearly say these words: we need to have a dialogue or negotiation on this issue at least before some external side impose (a) ‘solution’ on us (as Lebanese), let’s at least be a part of this plan.
Host:
Before you answer Dr Bahout’s questions, there is a major question today: is it reasonable for a country to change its regime every 10 years? Isn’t the dependence of these internal forces on foreign forces the factor that makes this regime and constitution ineffective after every regional change because they depend on foreign countries and are tied to these changes?
Matar:
– Not only are they dependent, Lebanon is very sensitive because it was originally established upon a structural problem, and Lebanon reflects foreign interests rather than the interests of its people.
– It’s subject to external powers, there is capital control despite all the external and regional economic transformations. It is based on political sectarianism and not on real (active and efficient) institutions, all these factors have made Lebanon fragile.
– Lebanon is a fragile country situated in the Middle East, the most conflict-ridden region in the world.
– (Former Prime Minister) Hassan Diab’s government would have made this crisis less bad, it would have distributed the losses equally.
– The political class is not subject to external powers only, it is intertwined and sometimes subordinate to rich individuals who have influence.
– From 2003 to 2018, $200 billion flowed to Lebanon and was used to import products (for the Lebanese market), or to pay off public debts and interests on debts.
Host:
But millions of (US) dollars were smuggled out of Lebanon last year!
Matar:
The dollars smuggled after the October 17, 2019 (‘revolution’)?
Host:
Yes.
Matar:
This is what I’m talking about.
Bahout:
I believe she meant smuggling (of US dollars) across the border (with Syria) and you’re talking about smuggling capital abroad.
Host:
I’m saying that in addition to what you’re saying, there’s ongoing smuggling across the borders.
Matar:
Comparing smuggling (currency/fuel etc) across the border to capital smuggling is comparing 0.001% to 100%.
Host:
$250 million was spent in two weeks and yet there was no fuel in Lebanon, how would this make 0%? The Lebanese people are facing humiliation at the petrol stations!
Matar:
– Since the end of the civil war, about $290 billion entered Lebanon, how much was smuggled? A billion (dollars)? What is that compared to $290 billion? Again, I will say it again for the audience to know, (this $290 billion) was spent on paying debts and buying goods for consumption for the benefit of the two major poles (capitalists and policies preventing a solution for the crisis) and a smaller amount was wasted due to the scams by politicians.
– The exchange rate (of USD to LBP) has been fixed since 1994 at $1=1,500 LBP so that we can import goods with $20 billion (USD every year) and so that certain sides can make profits.
– Politicians do not work independently from these financial interests.
– Bankers are a great part of the crisis, the Central Bank of Lebanon and owners of exclusive permits (for importing products) as well.
– They are all intertwined, politicians alone are not the reason behind the crisis. We should also hold accountable those people (behind the financial interests) whenever we want to make a change and suggest alternative solutions.
Host:
The Governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon wouldn’t have been able to take any decision if he wasn’t under the umbrella of this political class. Today he’s making decisions, and the financial policy that he followed (for example) – whose failure is today apparent – was he implementing this (policy) alone, or in complete harmony with this political class?
Matar:
– This is the entanglement of interests (which I spoke about).
– The Governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon manages the (current deep) crisis (of Lebanon) in a way that favours the interests he represents.
– For the past two years, through inflation and withdrawal of purchasing power, reduction of imports, encouragement of immigration – to bring money into Lebanon – reduction of public services, cutting people’s (bank( deposits and giving them their money in the Lebanese Pound, through these 5 steps, a great part of the banking sector and venture capitalists threw the crisis at us ordinary people.
– This wasn’t spontaneous, this (kind of) crisis management was led by elite politicians.
Host:
Why don’t you mention names (of the elites responsible for all this)?
Matar:
-They’re known, why would I waste time on this!
Host:
But it takes no time!
Bahout:
I’ll help you with names.
Matar:
Everyone knows who the ones responsible for this crisis are.
Host:
The Lebanese today want to know who are the people responsible for the current situation.
Matar:
– If you go to the streets and ask the people, they will give you names.
-They (the ones responsible for the crisis) show up on screens and defend these (political) decisions/policies, the Finance and Budget Committee played a major role in this issue (the crisis), the way parties voted in the Lebanese parliament, the ones in the government who disrupted the government’s plan are well known.
-There is a crisis of management (in Lebanon), but it is addressed by (redirecting) the (effects of the) crisis at us ordinary people!
– In order to make a change, we should face the ‘tyranny of capital’, which sectarianism protects and acts as a cover for by setting red lines.
– Sectarianism is a problem, but it wouldn’t have survived if there weren’t interests that needed to use it as a cover.
Host:
I wonder if you agree with those who believe – a point you haven’t mentioned – they clearly say, Hezbollah’s policy led Gulf countries to ‘punish’ Lebanon and stop their input of funds (into Lebanon’s economy), and that this is a major part of the (economic) collapse we have reached. Today if Hezbollah is striking Saudi Arabia through (Yemen’s) Houthis, consequently Saudi Arabia won’t be able to help Lebanon. What would you respond to this theory?
Matar:
– If this idea asserts that Hezbollah is striking the Saudis through the Houthis, then Saudis are striking Lebanon through the US that sponsors the Israelis, it would be as simple as that, I can play the same language game.
Host:
Dr Houssam, as we know, there is an organic relationship between Iran and Hezbollah, and Iran and the Houthis as well.
Matar:
– I’ll answer this question, you’re saying that some say there is a (cash) inflow problem in Lebanon.
– Which translates into, ‘they are not sending us funds anymore’. Isn’t that what you’re saying?
Host:
(They’re) strangling Lebanon.
Matar:
– ‘Strangling Lebanon’, meaning that there was cash flow (into Lebanon) that has now stopped? As I previously said, from 2003 till 2018, $200 billion entered Lebanon.
– We do not have a cash flow problem, the reduction of cash flow (from some Gulf states in recent times) cannot explain at all the situation we have reached.
Host:
The cash that entered in 2008 was due to a global crisis that led to the introduction of cash flow into Lebanon.
Matar:
True, it has a lot of names e.g increase in fuel price etc.
Host:
In 2016, after the issue with Mr Hariri in Saudi Arabia, the decision was taken (to stop the funding), and Lebanon started to collapse.
Matar:
– I want to ask you a question, is our crisis caused by a lack of cash flow (into Lebanon)?
Bahout:
So, we shouldn’t have gotten Mr Hariri out of Saudi Arabia (back when he was held against his will and forced to announce his resignation while there)? Is that what you meant?
Host:
I am not in a position to answer this question.
Bahout:
If we go with your logic, then we should’ve left him there.
Host:
I didn’t say ‘leave him’, I only said ‘since the problem of Mr Hariri in Saudi Arabia’.
Matar:
– We don’t have an actual cash flow crisis in Lebanon, there are still sums of $7 and $8 billion entering now, I’m not saying it wasn’t reduced due to the political factor, but its effect on the crisis is 1%? 2%? 5%? (Does this count as a major effect?).
– Why should the discussion be turned towards this point while we ignore the other factors?
Bahout:
May I comment?
Host:
Sure, but I wish to know, how did you understand from my words when I said ‘due to Saad Hariri’s issue’, that I meant that no one wants Saad Hariri to get out (of Saudi Arabia)?
Matar:
They got upset because we got him out!
Bahout:
There is a causal link according to your words.
Host:
The causal link is that Saudi Arabia got upset with Mr Saad Hariri and everything else that falls under the name of the March 14 (Alliance) because of their political choices, that’s a description of reality.
Bahout:
So, they held him against his will or kidnapped him in Saudi Arabia, and after being released with some effort (exerted by some Lebanese political sides), the cash flow stopped, isn’t that what we’re talking about?
Host:
I’m not talking about holding him against his will or kidnapping him, and Mr Hariri didn’t talk about this himself.
Bahout:
-This means it’s true, there’s a blockade on Lebanon (from the US/Gulf states etc).
– If there is an Arab – part of a Western – decision to stop cash flow into Lebanon to punish it for its political positions, it means that the theory of an Arab economic blockade is confirmed.
Host:
Allow me to ask, if Western states today demand the Lebanese political class to form a new government, any government, so that they can begin helping them, what blockade are we talking about?
Bahout:
I was commenting on the topic you (and Dr Matar) were talking about; the consequences of the regional decisions of Hezbollah, that they (apparently) led to a halt in cash flow (into Lebanon), from Arab states in particular, which was about $1 billion a year.
Matar:
Which is one fourth of (yearly) cash flow (into Lebanon).
Bahout:
– Indeed, it is a small amount, and (the cash flow) stopped.
– I can’t see what’s wrong with saying that there is an actual Arab economic blockade on Lebanon, and I’m not being on anyone’s side, that’s not my point.
-I would like to address Mr Matar and the side he represents; I agree with you (i.e. the host), and I believe a great part of responsibility lies with a main (political) component in the country, which is Hezbollah, not only in the crisis management, but also in the management of the bygone era.
-Hezbollah can’t do like other sides who deny having anything to do with the crisis, while in fact, they were sharing power and were a part of previous governments and the crisis management as well.
-I agree with you Mr Houssam on what the Governor of the central bank of Lebanon did, but in all the governments that covered his actions and decisions and allowed him to stay in his positions, if Hezbollah wasn’t a direct partner in it, Hezbollah’s allies were.
Matar:
Hezbollah accepts what you’re saying,
Bahout:
I’m aware of that.
Matar:
-That’s what I’m saying, Hezbollah said we bear part of the responsibility and for that we want to contribute to the solution.
Bahout:
-We talked about something that needs to be discussed quietly. Are we, Ms Nicole, really going to build a new economy based on financial inflow (from foreign states)?
Host:
Of course not, that’s a wrong financial policy!
Bahout:
– I consider and believe that the liberal (economic) model is over due to macroeconomic reasons.
-The question is: What will the new model be based on?
– An actual rational debate that has to take place in Lebanon.
Matar:
-That’s part of the new social contract.
Bahout:
– Turning to the East should be considered seriously, the whole world including Gulf states, Saudi Arabia etc are doing this.
Matar:
– The Europeans too.
Bahout:
– The UAE, and even Israel. Just a reminder, China today invests in the port of Haifa with about $23 billion.
– We, as Lebanese, should sit together and talk about it (rebuilding the economy) without insults and accusations.
– (We should consider a series of questions): how should we build tomorrow’s economy? Based on which elements? Do we want to have a rentier economy?
– A rentier economy necessitates a series of socio-economic consequences which Dr Houssam spoke about; we will remain dependent on foreign states, whenever an international crisis occurs, the US dollar will collapse because we import 80% of what we consume.
– We can adopt another economic model and accept (the fact) that our lifestyle will change, our network of foreign allies will change, the way we deal with the foreign world will change, we will no longer be regressive, we should protect or defend our interests.
Matar:
These are the questions (that must be discussed in a national) founding conference.
Bahout:
-This is a strategic choice, this is what re-establishing (Lebanon’s regime) is about, what else could it be?
– (Changing the economic policy) is one of the pillars of re-establishment, this would lead to (real change).
– The country has, since the October (17, 2019) revolution, been in an unbelievable chaos, we have forgotten (how to deal with the crisis rationally), and the situation is somehow similar to how things were back in 2005 (after the death of PM Rafiq Hariri).
– At the end of the day we shall sit together, let us sit down calmly with peace and a mentality (that welcomes) participation and coexistence.
Matar:
Yes.
Bahout:
– Without overpowering, and here I believe some blame rests with Hezbollah’s approach of dealing with some issues in the country.
– We must discuss how we should live economically and socially.
– I have questions for a side like Hezbollah; if the entity of the country was re-established tomorrow based on new foundations, what would the social fabric (of everyday life) be like? Would we be able to teach our children the way we used to? Would we be able to live like before? I’m addressing you (the host) because we belong to the same sect.
-These are the questions to be posed, but they can be only addressed on a negotiations table with calmness and open-mindedness, of course if the partner in the country, which is Hezbollah, agrees to this.
– If we want to establish a country capable of surviving for the next decades, we can’t escape this pathway.
– We can’t consider the other as an enemy due to some mischief that happened 20 years ago; the history of Lebanon is quite young, we’ve been like that since the 19th century, and the periods of stability in Lebanon are periods between two wars.
– We shouldn’t (think of) re-establishing the country only because there is a new war to happen, as some suggest i.e. that the (wider political) issue won’t be resolved without a battle.
-The question is, who today has the ability and the ethical and political courage to sit at the (negotiation) table and propose the issues we talked about?
Host:
I’ll give the stage to Dr Matar to answer your questions, but first I have to stop for a commercial.
Host:
Mr Bahout suggested several concerns about the stage we’re heading into, in order to conclude this issue and move on to other issues, with regards to the upcoming foundational stage which we agree we’re heading into, he posed several questions: Hezbollah’s weapons, Hezbollah calling for a (national) dialogue with all the other sides, and questions that most Lebanese people actually think of: how will our daily lives be in the upcoming stage, our education, medical treatment, things that Lebanon was really special for?
Matar:
– First, Hezbollah cannot call for a dialogue, I believe that wasn’t what Dr Bahout meant.
– Hezbollah said months ago that they’re ready for a national dialogue under the condition that everyone agrees to this, so that nobody assumes that we would consider that we are (translating our) regional victories into a change of balance in Lebanon.
– Unlike what some believe, Hezbollah has no benefit in the chaos because Hezbollah does not want to rule in Lebanon.
– Hezbollah wants to be freed as much as possible from the (responsibilities) of (managing/reforming/ruling e.t.c.) the regime/state, to instead put all its efforts in the cause it believes that it exists for, which is the resistance; to face the very strong and developing Israeli enemy is Hezbollah’s main concern, and participating in the country’s internal affairs should be only as much as other (sects and forces) want to participate (each representing their sects and parties) in the regime, and never to manage the (political) regime.
– The two sides that disagree on the idea of a founding conference is because:
(One side) believes that the Shias are powerful today and that reconsidering the Taif agreement will allow Shias to advance in Lebanon.
– For such people I say: you’ve got a thousand times greater concern (to worry about), the current (socio-economic) collapse you’re witnessing (poverty, immigration, etc.) ill blowback at you from your own sectarian group first.
– The other side disagrees (because) they have financial interests in the country, and they are aware that a political discussion would lead to a discussion of (who currently controls the country’s) wealth.
– If the (economic) system remains a rentier system, which means only 1% of Lebanese people are wealthy, a certain study says that 1% of those people own 60% of money deposited in (Lebanese) banks. Therefore this (side) refuses a (broader, foundational political) discussion because they don’t want this economic system they benefit from to change.
-These two sides are cooperating to impede a (national) dialogue.
– Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah’s proposal of a founding conference in 2012 was rejected because a part of these people were waiting for the fall of the Syrian state in the war in Syria (back in 2012), and a part of these (people) are still counting on a war with Israel or an external variable to weaken Hezbollah and then have a dialogue with it (so that Hezbollah won’t have a great share of power in Lebanon at that point).
– The Shias today do not feel marginalized, and I believe that they do not (seek to secure) high political ambitions (in Lebanon) because they have a cause called ‘resistance’ which is their priority.
– If we start a debate, no one will impose anything on anyone, at least we should explore our intentions; if you find that Hezbollah and the Amal (Movement) want to dominate you and take shares for the Shias, then stop the dialogue.
-The game of sectarianism is losing, people can see that sectarian groups aren’t providing the people with their needs.
– We must reshape the social contract between us, the people, and the state, and not between sects; we should re-explore how the wealth distribution should be.
– A part of the solution is expanding the social base of power; simply, it means we need a group of social reforms that Taif talked about too, we don’t have to bring much from outside the Taif.
– A discussion of an electoral system begins with the implementation of quotas not based on sectarianism, this is a personal opinion of mine, all of the aforementioned are personal opinions that might seem unusual (to some people).
– In conclusion, politicians should be afraid and change their performance, they should start representing us (Lebanese people) in the face of capitalists instead of working for them or being partners with them against us.
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